



IDENTIFIED MOTIVATION AND THE ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS 





























In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy in Management in the 
















IDENTIFIED MOTIVATION AND THE ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS 





























Dr. Jason (Xi) Kuang, Advisor 
Scheller College of Business 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 Dr. Kathy Wang 
Scheller College of Business 




Dr. Arnold Schneider 
Scheller College of Business 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 Dr. Donald R. Young 
Kelley School of Business 




Dr. Jane Thayer 
Scheller College of Business 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
  
   








To properly thank all those who have contributed to my progress and learning before and 
during my time at Georgia Tech, I would exceed the length of the narrative below. 
Therefore, I do apologize for those whom I have omitted from or otherwise neglected in 
this list. First, my trembling and insufficient gratitude to HaQadosh Barukh Hu for 
sustaining my life and blessing me with every tomorrow. To my parents Ann & Marty 
and sister Marla for raising me in a home which nourished curiosity and celebrated 
inquiry. To Rosana, Vladimir, Paola, & Kris for their support as we navigated this 
important time in our lives. To my primary advisor Dr. Jason Kuang for his guidance, 
candor, boundless patience, and unwavering commitment. To members of my 
dissertation committee, Drs. Schneider, Thayer, Wang, & Young, for their feedback and 
generosity. To the Georgia Tech Accounting faculty, who each in their own way 
illuminated another step to my winding path. To my Co-Authors & fellow PhD students, 
here and elsewhere, for their cherished camaraderie, encouragement, and critique.  
 
To my Sons Nathaniel & Emmanuel, who will never fully know how much joy and 
gladness they bring to our lives.  
 
And finally, to my Wife Gabi - my best friend, superhero, confidant, shelter, and the love 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii 
LIST OF TABLES v 
LIST OF FIGURES vi 
SUMMARY vii 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1 
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW & HYPOTHESES 8 
2.1 Standard Agency Theory Approach 8 
2.2 Preferential Subordinate Selection & Self-Determination Theory 10 
2.3 Identified Motivation Subordinates: Scarcity & Crowding Out 12 
2.4 Informal Management Control Systems & Stewardship Theory 14 
CHAPTER 3. EXPERIMENTAL METHODS & PROCEDURES 22 
3.1 Participants & Recruitment 22 
3.2 Instrument & Procedures 22 
3.3 Independent Variables 25 
3.4 Dependent Measures & PEQs 26 
CHAPTER 4. RESULTS & ANALYSIS 28 
4.1 Data Exclusions & Final Sample Construction 28 
4.2 Manipulation & Attention Checks 28 
4.3 Review of Hypothesis #1 Results – Subordinate Goal Congruence 29 
4.4 Review of Hypothesis #2 Results – Subsequent Cooperation 32 
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 34 
APPENDIX A.  SUPPORTING STATISTICAL FIGURES & TABLES 37 
APPENDIX B. EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS & MATERIALS 41 
5.1 Experimental Instructions 41 







LIST OF TABLES 
 
  
Table 1 - Descriptives - Allocation Task Withdrawal 37 
Table 2 - Two Way ANOVA on Allocation Task Withdrawal 38 
Table 3 - Descriptives: Allocation Task Deviation Score 39 
Table 4 - Two Way ANOVA on Allocation Task Deviation Score  39 
Table 5 - Descriptives: Common Pool Withdrawal 40 









Figure 1 - Pattern of Results + Predictions: Allocation Task Withdrawal 37 
Figure 2 - Pattern of Results + Predictions: Allocation Task Deviation Score 38 
Figure 3  - Pattern of Results + Predictions: Common Pool Withdrawal 40 
Figure 4 - Stylized Email (Conventional Frame) 44 
Figure 5 – Stylized Email (Nonformal Frame) 44 





Due to the limits of formal management control systems (MCS) for tasks with 
unobservable/non-contractible inputs, firms often preferentially select subordinates who 
exhibit identified motivation (strong perceptions of importance) towards the firm’s 
mission. While prior literature examines the “crowding out” of identified motivation by 
formal MCS, less is known about how informal MCS asymmetrically affect subordinates 
both with and without identified motivation. Given the difficulty in preferentially selecting 
subordinates with identified motivation relative to those without, I seek evidence of an 
informal control regime that can best utilize subordinates of all motivation levels. Using 
the frameworks of Self-Determination Theory and Stewardship Theory, I experimentally 
test subordinates’ goal congruence and subsequent cooperation with the superior under 
conventional directives vs “nonformal communications” (unofficial management 
guidance). Results confirm that informal controls do not crowd out identified motivation 







CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Where formal management control systems (MCS) are cost-prohibitive, 
ineffective, or otherwise misspecified for a given environment, superiors often hire 
specialized subordinates to overcome typical agency conflicts (Tucker, 2019; Cardinaels 
& Yin, 2015). This is especially prevalent for delegated tasks where subordinate inputs are 
not observable or measurable, such as sustainability efforts, mentorship, and research & 
development (Banker, Datar, & Maindiratta, 1988). This preferential selection often favors 
subordinates who view said tasks as genuinely important and aligned with their values, 
also known as those with identified motivation for an objective (Burton, Lydon, 
D’Alessandro, & Koestner, 2006). While the recruitment of identified motivation 
subordinates is widely accepted and endorsed by the research and practice literature 
(Kreutzer, Cardinal, Walter, & Lechner, 2016), few studies have addressed the potential 
drawbacks and how to remedy them.  
It is tenable that a firm cannot solely recruit and retain identified motivation 
subordinates, and must instead recruit subordinates with a range of motivation levels 
(including none at all) for unobservable tasks. Relative to the non-identified motivation (or 
“amotivated”) subordinate, those with identified motivation are less common in the labor 
pool, may not adapt well to changes in organizational mandates, and exhibit a higher 
propensity to deviate from stakeholder preferences (Chan & Zhang, 2019; Clark & 
Saxberg, 2019; Harter, 2018). Moreover, even if formal MCS are well-specified for a task, 
prior literature warns of the negative effects of such extrinsic control on subordinate 
motivation (also known as “crowd-out”) (Bénabou & Tirole, 2003; Christ, Emett, 
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Summers, & Wood, 2012). Unable to rely on either preferential subordinate selection or 
formal MCS, firms do have a thus far under-researched approach: the asymmetric effects 
of informal MCS on subordinates with and without identified motivation.  
In this study, I propose that the impacts of informal MCS over unobservable input 
tasks are divergently dependent on the subordinate’s identified motivation for the 
superior’s objective. While informal MCS can avoid crowd-out effects among subordinates 
with identified motivation, they may spark unintended consequences among amotivated 
subordinates. Using the frameworks of Self-Determination Theory (regarding divergent 
motivations) and Stewardship Theory (concerning differing management/control 
approaches), I test the relative effects of an informal control, “nonformal communications,” 
on subordinate goal congruence and subsequent cooperation with the superior. Nonformal 
communications are defined as nonbinding management directives that enculture 
subordinates to organizational norms. Typically occurring outside the traditional channels 
of management hierarchy, these nonformal communications can encompass intra-firm 
social media announcements, casual interactions between subordinates and superiors, and 
other unenforced organizational guidance. Such communications are intended to be 
supportive of management objectives without the negative repercussions/associations of 
formal control (Dirsmith & Covaleski, 1985; Weisner, 2018). I contrast this approach with 
“conventional” management communications, namely standard, transactional directives 
devoid of any intended enculturation. Emblematic of informal controls, nonformal 
communication carries no economically measurable enforceability, and the traditional 
economic prediction posits that no subordinate, identified motivation or otherwise, would 
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be materially impacted by an implementation or change in such a control (Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2004).  
However, prior work demonstrates that minor variations amongst communication 
styles can evoke divergent contextual cues, which in turn differentially affect the salient 
features of firm values (Ajzen & Sexton, 1999; Crump, Vaquero, & Milliken, 2008). 
Drawing on the aforementioned theories, I propose that amotivated subordinates, absent of 
any strong views on the superior’s objective, approach these unobservable tasks as a 
routine professional matter. When objectives are conventionally framed as a transactional 
directive, amotivated subordinates are more apt than identified motivation subordinates to 
comply with a superior’s priorities because the nature of their task and the manner in which 
it is communicated easily align. Conversely, a nonformal communication approach may 
induce amotivated subordinates to deviate from the superior’s goals. The flexible and 
collaborative nature of nonformal communication is of little value to an amotivated 
subordinate, and rather than engender stewardship behaviors, it may instead signal the 
superior’s laxity over the objective. No longer relating to the task as a transactional matter, 
the amotivated subordinate may then disregard the superior’s directive in favor of their 
own preferences/interests.  
For the identified motivation subordinate, a conventional approach will be 
perceived as a controlling behavior (albeit devoid of economic consequences) and crowd-
out their identified motivation with the objective. This crowd-out will reduce congruent 
and cooperative behaviors in turn. In contrast, a nonformal communication approach aligns 
the identified motivation subordinate with the superior by enculturing shared values and 
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emphasizing subordinate autonomy. This, in line with Stewardship Theory, may improve 
subordinate behaviors relative to a conventional approach. 
Based on prior management accounting literature, I also test the spillover effects 
on subordinates’ subsequent cooperation with the superior in an undirected task to measure 
the longer-term consequences of an informal control (Arnold, 2015; Coletti, Sedatole, & 
Towry, 2005; Garrett, Livingston, & Tayler, 2019). Given the multi-period nature of many 
superior/subordinate associations, a discussion of this topic would be incomplete without 
empirical analysis beyond the immediate influence of a control on subordinate behavior. 
By addressing spillover effects, the impact of a control regime can be either isolated as an 
ephemeral reaction or revealed as a stable, persistent determinant of subordinate behavior. 
As goal congruence is the primary dependent measure and I seek to capture a similar, but 
not redundant, spillover construct, I chose subsequent cooperation as the second variable 
of interest. By testing subsequent cooperation with the superior, it is possible to examine 
whether the use of an informal control generates any negative view of the superior (via 
observed, uncooperative behavior), and whether an initial effect is strong enough to persist 
into an alternate setting. To demonstrate that nonformal communications induce more than 
a fleeting response by the subordinate, I apply the same predictions to immediate and 
spillover effects: as compared to a conventional communication frame, nonformal 
communications will strengthen goal congruence and subsequent cooperation among 
identified motivation subordinates. But among amotivated subordinates, the use of a 
conventional communication frame will result in higher goal congruence and subsequent 
cooperation than nonformal communications. 
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I test my predictions in a two-stage protocol using a variant of the charity-modified 
dictator game and a common-pool game (Eckel & Grossman, 1996; List, 2007; Ostrom, 
2006). In the experiment, participants form supervisor – employee groups (1 supervisor to 
4 employees) where the supervisor chooses an endowment allocation recommendation to 
a pre-selected charitable organization. With minor variants in the wording, this choice is 
communicated via a stylized email to the employee either as a neutral, transactional 
directive (conventional communication frame) or a collaborative recommendation 
(nonformal communication frame). Critically, there is no formal monitoring or control 
enacted on the actual decision under either condition. The employee then allocates the 
endowment as they wish with an additional option to withdraw whatever percentage of the 
endowment (at a penalty) for personal payoff. In a subsequent common pool game devoid 
of any controls or communications, the employee allocates another endowment between 
themselves and their previously-paired supervisor. As dependent measures, I capture and 
analyze how much of the endowment the participant withdraws from the allocation task, 
how the participant’s allocation to the charity deviates from the supervisor’s 
directive/recommendation, and the amount withdrawn by the participant from the common 
pool game. The first two proxy for subordinate goal congruence, and the last one proxies 
for subsequent cooperation.  
Results are supportive of my predictions on the dependent measures of allocation 
deviation and common pool withdrawals, and partially supportive of my predictions on 
allocation task withdrawals. Compared to a conventional frame, a nonformal 
communication approach increases goal congruence and subsequent cooperation among 
identified motivation participants without any material crowd-out. By comparison, 
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amotivated subordinates exhibit higher levels of goal congruence and subsequent 
cooperation than their identified motivation counterparts under a conventional 
communication frame, and those behaviors drop precipitously under a nonformal 
communication frame. Across all conditions and dependent variables, the use of an 
informal control worsened outcomes among amotivated participants compared to 
identified motivation participants.  
This study contributes to the management control literature by providing evidence 
for the asymmetric effects of informal controls vis-à-vis innate subordinate preferences and 
motivations. Building on prior studies that examine the boundaries and conditions of 
informal controls like self-certification and organizational value statements, this study 
demonstrates that the efficacy of management-enacted informal controls can be dependent 
on subordinate identified motivation (Akinyele, Arnold, & Sutton, 2020; Ang & Cheng, 
2016). Moreover, this study addresses the potential limitations and even backlash effects 
of informal controls. Contrary to the common expectations of informal controls, the 
evidence from this experiment reveals that an attempt to modify behavior via non-
economically enforceable means can actually worsen results compared to informal 
controls’ absence. This study also replicates prior findings on the benefits and hazards of 
recruiting identified motivation subordinates. Under the appropriate conditions where 
collaboration and autonomy are emphasized, such subordinates exhibit a significantly 
stronger level of positive behaviors compared to amotivated subordinates. Yet, even a 
neutral, transactional approach to subordinates with identified motivation can cause 
crowding out of said motivation and a stark deterioration in compliant behaviors. Finally, 
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the study demonstrates that some tenets of Stewardship Theory generalize to a mixed 
environment comprising subordinates of varying motivation levels.  
My results have practical implications for the design and maintenance of 
management control systems for unobservable tasks. Due to their relatively lower cost of 
implementation and culturally adaptable flexibility, firms may be quick to rely on uniform 
informal controls for subordinates both with and without identified motivation. This study 
provides preliminary evidence that such an approach may be unintentionally sub-optimal. 
While informal controls improve goal congruence and cooperation among identified 
motivated subordinates without concerns of motivation crowd-out, they seemingly give 
license to amotivated subordinates for poor coordination and cooperation with the superior. 
This study provides some support for the selective implementation of control systems 
based on subordinate characteristics and the dangers of misaligned control regimes. Further 
studies may elucidate to what extent these findings generalize to other management-












CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW & HYPOTHESES 
2.1 Standard Agency Theory Approach 
Where the preferences, priorities, and utility maximization functions of the 
archetype principal and agent diverge, they result in a seemingly intractable chasm between 
the parties known as an agency conflict1. Whether an agency conflict stems from a 
misspecified recruitment, dissimilar risk profiles, rent-seeking on private information, or 
contract incompleteness, mitigating measures are often (but not always) available to either 
party. Among other factors, standard Agency Theory is predicated on the presence of 
observable, measurable, and contractible metrics between a superior and subordinate 
(Baiman, 1990). Many common approaches in resolving agency conflicts emphasize these 
metrics, such as relative performance evaluation, audit regimes, participatory budgeting, 
and intra-firm financial reporting/disclosure (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Kachelmeier & 
Williamson, 2010; Kelly, Presslee, & Webb, 2017). Along with narrowing information 
asymmetry between parties and curtailing the potential for misaligned incentives and 
malfeasance, these approaches utilize several extant accounting processes in the support of 
well-functioning principal/agent relationships.  
However, in addition to standard observable tasks for which data are routinely 
collected and analyzed, many agents either partially or wholly engage in critical work 
functions that are difficult to contract for and, at best, only observable with time-lagged, 
noisy metrics. These functions may include mentoring of junior employees, cultivation of 
external relationships, research & development, pro-social efforts, and sustainability 
 
1 In this narrative, I will interchange “Principal” with “Superior” and “Agent” with “Subordinate” (respectively). 
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initiatives. And although some output, end-result components of these pursuits may be 
observed with temporally or conceptually distant proxies, their inputs are characteristically 
impractical or cost-ineffective to monitor. These can include metrics such as effort (in all 
its varieties), creativity, and honesty (Hannan, McPhee, Newman, & Tafkov, 2013; 
Speckbacher, 2017; Newman, 2014). 
Assuming contract incompleteness and an inability to comprehensively observe 
subordinate behavior, standard agency conflicts are often ameliorated with a formal 
management control system (MCS). Such a system varies, but all formal MCS share some 
basic characteristics. They can be enforced with economically measurable consequences, 
they are intentionally designed as a means of subordinate monitoring, and they utilize 
information relevant to the controlled environment  (Christ, 2013; Simons, 1987). Ranging 
from the simplicity of a supervisor-approved timesheet to the intricacy of real-time fraud 
detection, a formal MCS characteristically features a predictable and quantifiable outcome 
from non-compliance. Formal MCS can be tailored to a range of situations and structured 
as ex ante or ex post, individual-based or group-based, and bonus vs. penalty oriented 
(Christ, Emett, Summers, & Wood, 2012; Emett, Guymon, Tayler, & Young, 2019; Kuang 
& Moser, 2009). Formal MCS often manifest in the forms of audit regimes (Eulerich & 
Lakinichenko, 2018), budget authority assignments (Hannan, Rankin, & Towry, 2010), 
subjective performance evaluation2 (Prendergast & Topel, 1993), and horizontal 
subordinate monitoring (Sedatole, Swaney, & Woods, 2016). But these options may not be 
available for the aforementioned, unobservable subordinate tasks. For those tasks, either 
 
2 This approach, a vast literature in itself, is often proposed as an alternative to informal control systems given 
unobservable behavior. However, it carries a much higher cost of administration, introduces various evaluation 
biases, and, if linked to compensation, risks crowding out identified motivation. For additional readings on this topic, 
see Bol & Smith, 2011, Chan et al., 2018, and J.P. Hao, 2020.  
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they occur entirely outside of a reliable and cost-effective monitoring schema or there is 
no universally agreed upon unit of measure by which to evaluate them. Without any widely 
recognized metrics or cost-effective enforcement mechanism for resolving agency 
conflicts in these tasks, superiors are unable to monitor and control subordinate behaviors 
and actions through traditional, formal MCS.   
2.2 Preferential Subordinate Selection & Self-Determination Theory 
Without the possibility of a formal control framework, many firms/superiors elect 
to preferentially select subordinates who exhibit goal congruence with the firm’s objectives 
(Miller, 2011). This preferential subordinate selection3 might target those with professional 
certifications or credentials, specialized abilities, or similar values/preferences to the 
superior (Abernethy, Dekker, & Schulz, 2015). The assumption is that these qualities and 
the resultant alignment between superior and subordinate priorities will mitigate the 
problematic divergence between cooperative and self-interested subordinate behavior 
(Campbell, 2012). In turn, this diminishes the need for formal monitoring and control. 
Proper selection of subordinates has also been shown to reduce downstream control costs 
or entirely obviate the need for such controls (Liu, Liu, & Chu, 2019). Social-mission 
organizations, not-for-profit firms, and certain government agencies are examples of 
sectors that value subordinates with such other-regarding preferences (Chen, Pesach, & 
Wang, 2020; van Loon, Baekgaard, & Moynihan, 2020; Chan & Zhang, 2019). While prior 
literature compares selection of better qualified vs. more engaged subordinates (Grabner, 
Posch, & Wabnegg, 2018; Abernethy, Dekker, & Schulz, 2015), this study focuses on those 
 
3 Also referred to in the literature as “employee selection.” I use “subordinate selection” for the sake of simplicity and 
conformity with other constructs used in the narrative.  
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subordinates with an innate motivation towards the firm’s objective. To better understand 
the variant motivational archetypes for such preferentially selected subordinates, I utilize 
the framework of Self-Determination Theory (SDT).  
SDT departs from prior theoretical work on personal motivation by categorizing 
motivation into distinct types rather than focusing solely on the presence/absence and 
valance of motivation towards a given objective/task. Originally framed as a contrast 
between “mindless” and “mindful” decisions and their antecedents (Deci & Ryan, 1980), 
the theory evolved to differentiate between three broad categories of motivation: 
amotivation, controlled motivation, and autonomous motivation. The first denotes a lack 
of motivation, the second describes externally regulated motivation, and the third a 
personally derived motivation. Controlled (also referred to as “extrinsic”) motivation is 
driven by exogenous factor(s), typically in the forms of positive and negative consequences 
for resultant behaviors. While controlled motivation is not inherently undesirable or ill-
suited for common circumstances, autonomous motivation is thought to be the strongest 
and most impactful type as it activates the highest order fulfillment of internal drive and 
volition. Prior work also finds that autonomous motivation is most pronounced with three 
key assumptions that fulfill basic psychological needs: competence, relatedness, and 
autonomy (Burton, Lydon, D’Alessandro, & Koestner, 2006). In addition to several studies 
in the accounting literature concerning subordinate behavior, this theory has been 
generalized into a diverse range of environments such as education, healthcare, and other 
professional relationships (Deci & Ryan, 2008).  
Prior accounting literature establishes the dominance of autonomous motivation 
over controlled motivation vis-à-vis long-term performance, effort, and other financial 
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matters of interest (Lukka & Pfister, 2019; Stone, Bryant, & Wier, 2010; Kunz & Pfaff, 
2002). Autonomous motivation is further bifurcated by SDT into two constructs: intrinsic 
vs. identified motivation. Intrinsic motivation, often used in the accounting literature, 
describes a behavior or activity that is enjoyable or rewarding. Identified motivation is 
broadly defined as a person’s belief that an action or behavior is inherently worthwhile, 
valuable, and efficacious (Burton, Lydon, D’Alessandro, & Koestner, 2006). Through the 
example of exercise, those with controlled motivation exercise due to doctor’s orders, the 
intrinsically motivated exercise for fun regardless of health benefits, and those with 
identified motivation exercise because they genuinely believe it will maintain their health. 
In the managerial accounting context, the last construct of identified motivation better 
generalizes to subordinates motivated to engage in unobservable, professional tasks. 
Despite a subordinate’s inclination towards certain professional tasks, such tasks cannot be 
readily construed as “enjoyable” in the manner originally intended by SDT. Departing from 
prior accounting literature that relied on the connection between intrinsic motivation and 
“enjoyable” tasks, I instead utilize the construct of identified motivation and the emphasis 
on value-connection. A similar approach has been used in more recent accounting studies 
focused on management control systems (Chen, Lill, & Vance, 2020; Cockrell, Stone, & 
Wier, 2018; Chen, Pesach, & Wang, 2020).  
2.3 Identified Motivation Subordinates: Scarcity & Crowding Out 
Although the preferential selection of identified motivation subordinates appears to 
be a workable solution to the agency conflicts inherent in unobservable tasks, there are two 
potential drawbacks. The first is the relative dearth of identified motivation subordinates 
in the labor pool. Prior studies demonstrate the wide identified motivation variance among 
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different subordinate measures like age and education level (Lord & Farrington, 2006), and 
recurring surveys of workers (in the USA) show that engaged/motivated employees 
comprise less than a third of all workers (Harter, 2018). Very few firms can exclusively 
depend on identified motivation subordinates, and the typical firm will likely comprise 
subordinates of different identified motivation levels or perhaps no motivation at all.  
The second drawback of preferentially selecting identified motivation subordinates 
concerns their reactions to extrinsic controls. In the event that a contract shares observable 
and non-observable tasks, or in the event that previously unobservable tasks gain 
contractible metrics, a formal MCS may still be applicable to identified motivation 
subordinates. This formal MCS would readily constitute an extrinsic motivation for 
behavior. Much literature has addressed the ramifications of motivation crowd-out from 
extrinsic control, including diminished honesty in budget reporting, decreased pro-
sociality, and weakened peer cooperation  (Wong-on-Wing, Guo, & Lui, 2010; Park, 2016; 
Garrett, Holderness Jr., & Olsen, 2020). Other studies isolate the secondary effects of 
extrinsic control system implementation, such as a perceived lack of trust by the superior 
and a detraction from the positive effects of social norms (Heinle, Hofmann, & Kunz, 2012; 
Donnelly, Kennedy, & Widener, 2021; Garrett, Livingston, & Tayler, 2019). Although the 
extant literature recognizes the effectiveness of formal MCS, the harm to identified 
motivation from extrinsic control/motivation obviates the very purpose of selecting 
subordinates with identified motivation.  
The evidence and arguments above posit that, for unobservable tasks, firms cannot 
rely on formal MCS procedures, preferential subordinate selection, or some combination 
thereof. Even if contractible metrics are available, the use of a formal MCS has been shown 
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to crowd out the positive behaviors of those with identified motivation. In addition, firms 
cannot entirely utilize preferential selection of subordinates with identified motivation due 
to their relative scarcity in the labor pool. Given these constraints, I propose informal 
control systems as a potential solution.  
2.4 Informal Management Control Systems & Stewardship Theory 
The distinction between formal and informal management control systems is 
elusive and often utilized in the literature without explicit definition. Some simply contrast 
the economic vs. non-economic effects of formal vs. informal systems, respectively, and 
treat the various informal control system approaches as fairly interchangeable. Others 
approach certain informal controls as materially distinct from others without consideration 
of the underlying similarities. In short, informal controls are a blend of socio-cultural 
norms, firm/industry customs, and self-restraint (Tucker, 2019). Although they do indeed 
lack economically measurable enforceability, they have tangible economic impact by the 
potential to improve firm outcomes (Altenburger, 2017). Unlike formal MCS, informal 
controls do not require the explicit inclusion of measurable and contractible metrics. 
Formal MCS are inherently intentional and deliberately enacted by the superior, but 
informal MCS can be of either organic evolution among subordinates or purposely 
promulgated by the superior (Tucker, 2019).  
Some examples of informal controls that have been experimentally tested in the 
accounting literature are activation of social norms (Cardinaels & Yin, 2015), ethical self-
certification (Ang & Cheng, 2016), peer-group influences (Nikias, 2019), and the reliance 
on superior-subordinate trust (Libby & Lindsay, 2019). Critically, since informal MCS do 
not involve monitoring, expected economic value, or contractible metrics, they do not 
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constitute “extrinsic control,” and therefore do not crowd-out identified motivation 
(Reeson & Tisdell, 2008; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006). A secondary benefit of monitoring’s 
absence is the lower cost and ease of implementation compared to formal MCS (Brown, 
Sprinkle, & Way, 2021). Assuming that the use of informal controls addresses both the 
lack of formal MCS for unobservable tasks and the difficulty in recruiting identified 
motivation subordinates, the next step is to ascertain which informal control may be well-
specified for this setting.  
While many informal MCS could be readily applicable to unobservable tasks, 
Stewardship Theory provides a relatable context for finding an easily implemented option. 
Often touted as the complement of standard Agency Theory and its prototypical parties of 
pure self-interest, Stewardship Theory is an alternative framework for the psychological, 
situational, and cultural mechanisms that foment pro-organizational, cooperative 
subordinate behaviors. Stewardship Theory is centered around a collaboration-based 
relationship rather than the control-based relationship of Agency Theory, and seeks to 
promote longer-term, multi-stakeholder welfare (Davis, Frankforter, Vollrath, & Hill, 
2007). Complementary to the arms-length and divergent preferences assumptions of 
Agency Theory, Stewardship Theory proposes that environments are most conducive to 
maximization of firm utility where the subordinate is autonomously motivated, team-
oriented, and dedicated to the mission (Hernandez, 2012). Among other psychological 
antecedents of behavior, Stewardship Theory provides a structure for inducing 
commitment by emphasizing psychological needs, low power distance, and delegation of 
authority. However, Stewardship Theory recognizes that there will still be environments 
where the traditional approach will be most suitable, and some prior literature recommends 
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a continuum of management approaches between Agency & Stewardship theories rather 
than a binary choice (Hernandez, 2012). Thus, a Stewardship approach may be well-suited 
for firms that hire subordinates both with and without identified motivation for tasks with 
no observable/measurable metrics (Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois, & Jegers, 2012).  
Similar to SDT, Stewardship Theory stresses the need for subordinate autonomy 
and the importance of granting subordinate discretion for steward-like behavior (Davis, 
Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). The theory also makes specific mention of subordinate 
autonomous motivation towards the superior’s objectives as a key factor in promoting 
collaboration and goal congruence. While many approaches may be well-specified in this 
context, I chose to test “nonformal communication” as an informal control for this setting 
of unobservable input tasks. Nonformal communications is a broad reflection of how a firm 
conveys non-binding directives to subordinates, and can manifest in a wide range of 
approaches. Whether by unenforced guidance, ad hoc supervisor advice, or even novel 
communication channels such as intra-firm social media networks, nonformal 
communications are intended to bolster organizational values and culture (Dirsmith & 
Covaleski, 1985; Weisner, 2018). Reflective of the dialectics between Agency and 
Stewardship Theories, such communications may be structured to emphasize chain of 
command versus teamwork, innovation versus historical practice, risk-seeking versus risk-
aversion, and many other defining characteristics of either approach (Davis, Schoorman, 
& Donaldson, 1997). The proposed informal control I test contrasts a conventional vs. 
nonformal communication frame4. In an attempt to mirror the contrast between Agency 
and Stewardship Theories, the former reflects a transactional, hierarchical, power-based 
 
4 A similar approach using “Communicated Values” was utilized in Kachelmeier, Thornock, & Williamson, 2016 
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relationship between superiors and subordinates, and the latter a more empowering, risk-
tolerant, and low-distance relationship5. Each framing reflects managerial attitudes and 
communications that can occur at all organizational levels and across sectors, and it fulfills 
the criteria of an informal control as mentioned above.  
A conjunction of SDT and Stewardship Theory forms a relatively straightforward 
prediction for the identified motivation subordinate. Under a conventional frame, bereft of 
any collaborative or empowering guidance from the superior, an objective is transmitted to 
the subordinate as an ordinary, transactional directive. Even devoid of any economically 
enforceable consequences to goal incongruence, I predict that there will still be observed 
crowding-out of motivation due to a perceived lack of autonomy and absence of shared 
goals. This stifling of motivation will in turn promote maladaptive subordinate behaviors 
and induce the subordinate to deviate from the superior’s priorities. However, the opposite 
may occur with the use of nonformal communications. By emphasizing the subordinate’s 
autonomy, enculturing the subordinate to firm values in a collaborative manner, and 
framing the task as one of shared interest, the subordinate’s identified motivation will be 
supported. In tandem with the psychological antecedents specified by Stewardship Theory, 
such an approach will lead to increased subordinate goal congruence with the superior’s 
objectives. 
For the amotivated subordinate, I predict that conventional framing will actually 
yield more goal congruence than a nonformal communications approach. This prediction 
is rooted in the Stewardship Theory tenets of subordinate autonomous motivation and 
 
5 I use conventional framing language that mimics a standard agency approach as a baseline for comparison to 
nonformal communications. While such a framing would invariably be backed by a formal MCS in vivo, both 
experimental conditions are devoid of formal MCS characteristics to prevent issues of compound manipulation.   
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identification with the objective. Absent any connection to the welfare of external 
stakeholders or the broader goals of the superior, the amotivated subordinate arguably has 
no potential to connect to the task in any manner of stewardship. Regardless of the 
superior’s preferences, to the amotivated subordinate, the task is and remains an economic 
transaction to be executed in line with standard professional conventions. Thus, a 
communication that aligns with conventional superior/subordinate norms will align with 
the transactional nature of the task and prompt the amotivated subordinate to comply. 
Conversely, the introduction of collaborative and autonomy-activating language might 
only discount the superior’s preferences rather than strengthen them in the eyes of the 
amotivated subordinate. While a superior invoking elements of empowerment and 
collective responsibility is well-suited for identified motivation subordinates, the 
amotivated subordinate may instead perceive it as too divergent from the typical economic 
transaction and indeed a sign of laxity or weak preferences. I therefore suggest that the 
superior will only discourage goal congruence among amotivated subordinates when 
utilizing nonformal communications, and that a conventional approach instead yields 
superior outcomes. 
H1 – For an unobservable task, identified motivation (amotivated) 
subordinates will exhibit higher (lower) levels of goal congruence with 
superiors’ nonformal communication than with superiors’ conventional 
communication. The opposite pattern of goal congruence will occur under 
conventional communication.  
Ideally, the benefits of an informal MCS would persist beyond limited, short-term 
effects on subordinate behavior and into other settings devoid of the control approach. 
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Given the multi-period nature of most professional relationships and system 
implementations, an effective (formal or informal) MCS must demonstrate efficacy beyond 
short-term effects, and spill over into subsequent interactions and dissimilar environments. 
Should the effects of nonformal communications be only a transient reaction rather than a 
persistent change in subordinate behavior, their use and appropriateness for practice would 
be limited. If subordinates engage in a mix of task environments as previously proposed, 
MCS effects on unobservable tasks may not necessarily carry over into other tasks. And if 
the prior hypothesized effects for a given control’s usage on specific groups are present in 
the short run, it is tenable that those effects would persist even after the control approach 
is no longer present. To proxy for this and for a broader view into how subordinate 
reactions/views spill over into other matters, I extend these predictions onto a subsequent, 
uncontrolled, cooperation task devoid of any communication from the superior.  
I test cooperative subordinate behaviors because they can provide insight into how 
the subordinate perceived and reacted to the control. Cooperation is also a reliable measure 
of reciprocity between subordinate and superior. Prior research explores how the very 
choice of a control system is often regarded by the subordinate as an extension of the 
superior’s own views towards said subordinate (Brink, Coats, & Rankin, 2018; Zhang, 
2008). And subsequent cooperative/uncooperative behavior on an uncontrolled task is 
widely utilized as a proxy for the likelihood of positive/negative reciprocity between the 
parties (Davidson, 2019; Hesford, Mangin, & Pizzini, 2020; Fisher, Peffer, Sprinkle, & 
Williamson 2015).  Where subordinates (of any motivation level) recognize a control 
system as well-specified for themselves/their environment, and assuming the control is in 
some way attributable to the superior, subsequent cooperative behaviors are indicative of 
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a desire to reciprocate positively towards the superior in future interactions. This task also 
allows for the spillover effects of a given control approach to be observed in a different 
environment. Distinct from the goal congruence of the allocation task, measuring 
cooperation provides more insight into how the subordinate perceives the control itself 
rather than the specific directive/recommendation of the superior. Similar approaches have 
been used in recent accounting studies on the effects of formal MCS on team collaboration 
(Coletti, Sedatole, & Towry, 2005), the transitions between informal and formal control 
systems (Tayler & Bloomfield, 2011), the perceptions of extrinsic controls on coordination 
(Garrett, Livingston, & Tayler, 2019), and peer effects on norm “stickiness” (Emett, 
Guymon, Tayler, & Young, 2019). Based on standard economic theory and absent any 
formal control, a subordinate has no incentive to cooperate when given the opportunity to 
make a wholly self-interested decision. However, I extend the pattern of predictions 
outlined vis-à-vis goal congruence into cooperation as well.  
For identified motivation subordinates, I predict that just as a nonformal 
communication frame recasts a transaction to a shared decision, this heightened connection 
between the subordinate and superior will persist into subsequent tasks without any 
additional directives or communications. However, the crowd-out expected from a 
conventional framing will also persist into subsequent interactions and result in diminished 
cooperation. Conversely for amotivated subordinates, just as the mismatch of nonformal 
communications with standard economic transactions will only reinforce laxity and 
deviation from superior directives, so too will such subordinates favor their own interests 
over those of the superior when subsequently given the opportunity to so. For a 
conventional frame, I predict that the proper alignment of superior directives with the 
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nature of an economic transaction will also inform the subsequent task, and amotivated 
subordinates will cooperate more than with nonformal communications. 
H2 –Identified motivation (amotivated) subordinates will exhibit higher 
(lower) levels of subsequent cooperation after an unobserved task guided 
by superiors’ nonformal communication than with superiors’ conventional 
communication. The opposite level of subsequent cooperation will occur 














CHAPTER 3. EXPERIMENTAL METHODS & PROCEDURES 
3.1 Participants & Recruitment 
As this study seeks to generalize to the standard subordinate/superior relationship, 
no specialized participant pool was selected (Kachelmeier & King, 2002; Libby, 
Bloomfield, & Nelson, 2002). Three hundred and forty participants were recruited through 
the Prolific experimental platform, of which 57% were female and 43% were male. The 
average participant age was approximately 32 years old, and the participants had an 
average of 9.5 years’ professional experience. Several papers have examined the use of 
online experiments and found them to be a suitable proxy for studies requiring no advanced 
knowledge or skill (Farrell, Grenier, & Leiby, 2017; Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, & Acquisti, 
2017; Palan & Schitter, 2018; Owens & Hawkins, 2018). The study was pre-screened for 
individuals at 18 years of age or above, fluent in English, and residing in the United States 
of America. The protocol was approved by the Institute’s Institutional Review Board.  
3.2 Instrument & Procedures 
The sessions were double-blind and did not use deception, and the instrument was 
programmed using the oTree platform (Chen, Schonger, & Wickens, 2016) with the 
oTreeutils add-on package (Konrad, 2019). Participants first completed a series of pre-
experimental questionnaires and a filler task, both for the purposes of a pre-manipulation 
IV measurement without any salience to the participant. After reviewing the consent form 
and agreeing to proceed, participants were first asked to rate their passion towards various 
charity sectors. A randomized listing of charitable sectors was presented, including the one 
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involved in the study. Participants then completed a survey regarding various other 
social/political views and were directed to a filler task.  The filler task was a review of 
different French Fry varieties, chosen for its benign content and ability to distract from any 
potential gleaning of the pre-experimental questionnaire’s purpose6. Aside from a single 
charity sector rating from the first questionnaire page, all other responses were disregarded. 
After reviewing the filler task information and answering two “dummy” attention check 
questions on the materials, participants were directed to the main experiment.  
In a charity-modified dictator game (Eckel & Grossman, 1996), four employees are 
paired with a supervisor in a one-shot setting. The supervisor participant was first directed 
to choose from a listing of possible endowment allocations to a not-for-profit in the animal 
advocacy sector7. The supervisor was informed that this choice would then be 
communicated to other participants in the experiment for execution. To ensure the eventual 
allocations were robust to a diversity of recommendations, I varied the (pre-set) purpose 
allocation options available to the supervisor. Every choice contained some combination 
of administrative, fundraising, and two specific program options. This was done to create 
some tension for the employee participant – it is uncommon to designate charitable 
allocations for administrative and fundraising purposes. Had the instructions allocated a 
material share of the endowment to programs alone, it would likely face little pushback 
from employee participants. Once the supervisor selected an option, they completed basic 
demographic post experiment questionnaires (PEQs), were informed of the charity’s 
 
6 A 45-second “Next” button delay was enacted on this task to ensure participants reviewed the information.  
7 A separate survey was conducted before experimental sessions began to identify, from a list of several sectors, 
which one was the least controversial while still eliciting a wide variability of passion/motivation. The animal advocacy 




identity and the experimental dollar to USD conversion rate (4000 E.D.: $1), and ended 
their study.  
Employee participants were prompted to assume the role of a mid-sized firm’s 
department manager tasked with distributing community engagement funds. After reading 
instructions, they reviewed a generic/stylized email from the firm’s “CEO” (the paired 
supervisor participant in the study) with a message to allocate the endowment per the 
CEO’s directive. To manipulate nonformal communication, the email was written in either 
a business-like, instructive tone (conventional frame) or a collaborative and discretionary 
tone (nonformal frame). These wording choices (both versions are available in Appendix 
B) are the only manipulated, independent variable in the study. After reading the email8, 
the employee participant was directed to an input screen where they allocated a 5000 
experimental dollar endowment between administrative, fundraising, and the two specific 
program options by percentage. The employee participant was also permitted to withdraw 
the entire endowment or any percentage thereof at a 50% penalty. This withdrawal 
percentage is one of two dependent measures that proxy for subordinate goal congruence.  
After deciding on the allocation, the employee participant was directed to play a 
modified common pool game with another 5000 experimental dollar endowment (Ostrom, 
2006). Free of any instruction or other communication from the superior, the employee 
participants were allowed to withdraw up to and including the entire amount, but whatever 
amount was left in the pool would be multiplied by 1.6 and evenly divided between the 
 
8 As an experimental control, the “Next” button was hidden for 20 seconds after the email page loaded. This was 
explained to the participant beforehand, and ensured that the participant had ample time to review the email and 
prevented spurious advances through the instrument.  
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employee participant and the associated supervisor participant9. After this decision, the 
employee participants completed PEQs, were informed of the charity’s identity and the 
experimental dollar to USD conversion rate, given a payoff summary, and ended their 
study. PEQs included demographics, written responses to explain their allocation 
decisions, an attention check to confirm they were aware of the option to withdraw funds 
from the first allocation task at a 50% reduction, and ratings on their impressions of the 
email they viewed. The average compensation with bonus payments was approximately 
$1.43 for an average completion time of approximately 10 minutes (average hourly rate 
~$8.50). All payments were processed to participants within four business days of each 
session, and $267 (rounded up) was raised and remitted to the charitable organization. 
3.3 Independent Variables 
To manipulate the independent variable of “Communication Frame,” I varied the 
language used in the stylized email received by employee participants. For the conventional 
communication condition, the email tone was formal and instructive. For the nonformal 
communication condition, the email text emphasized collaboration and autonomy. Sample 
texts of the emails, allocations, and other experimental materials are provided in Appendix 
B. To capture the measured IV of “Identified Motivation,” all participants were asked in 
the PEQ to rate their passion for the animal rights sector on a 9-point scale [-4, +4] where 
-4 represented “None at All” and +4 reflected “Very passionate.”  
As identified motivation towards animal rights is a personality trait rather than a 
cognitive state and is therefore less susceptible to momentary influence, obtaining this 
 
9 The common pool game parameters were chosen so that cooperation would always diminish the employee 
participant’s payoff, thereby biasing against predictions and preventing spurious cooperative behaviors. 
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measure directly after experimental manipulations does not materially impair validity. 
(Baumeister, 2014; Robins, Fraley, & Krueger, 2007). In order to categorize participants 
for the purposes of analysis, I first compared the average pre-experiment questionnaire 
response regarding the animal rights sector to the average post-experiment questionnaire 
response. In support of the PEQ rating NOT being affected by the 
experiment/manipulations, the two ratings were materially aligned with a Cronbach’s 
Alpha of 0.914. Due to severe between-cell sample size imbalance when using the pre-test 
rating, I rely on the PEQ rating for assigning participants into the measured IV categories. 
Based on a percentile partitioning of the scores, the 10% lower-most and 10% upper-most 
ratings were used to assign responses to amotivated and identified motivation categories, 
respectively. The lower bound range was a response between -4 and 0 (inclusive) and the 
upper bound range was a score of 4. The 10% lowest and 10% highest ranges were used in 
order to ensure a strong difference between participant motivation levels and a clearer 
proxy for how amotivated vs. identified motivation subordinates handle management 
directives. Because of the previously mentioned, between-cell sample size imbalance, the 
results described below are not observed when using the pre-test rating10. 
3.4 Dependent Measures & PEQs 
To proxy for the dependent variable of “subordinate goal congruence,” two 
measures from the experiment were taken. One measure is the penalized endowment 
withdrawal from the allocation task, and the other is a deviation score. The endowment 
withdrawal both proxies for a subordinate’s self-interested economic decisions and ensures 
 
10The pre-test featured a 7-point Likert scale whereas the PEQ utilized a 9-point Likert scale. This is potentially the 
source of ANOVA cell imbalances when assigning based on pre-test ratings.  
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that the choices made in the experiment were truly indicative of the participant’s 
preferences. The value is a percentage ranging from 0 (no withdrawal) to 100 (total amount 
withdrawn). The deviation score measures how closely an employee’s chosen allocation 
matched the CEO’s suggested allocation. This score is calculated first by summing the 
absolute value of the employee’s choice less the CEO’s choice for each of the four potential 
allocation options. That difference was then divided by the CEO’s choice, and the four 
scores were combined into a final score. The value ranges from 0 to 4, with 0 representing 
an employee exactly matching the CEO’s recommendation and 4 representing total 
disregard (usually in the form of withdrawing the entire endowment from the experiment 
at a penalty). A higher penalized endowment withdrawal and a higher deviation score 
proxy for diminished goal congruence with the superior. To measure subsequent 
cooperation, I used the employee participant’s withdrawal amount from the modified 
common-pool game. This value again ranges from 0 to 5000. A higher withdrawal indicates 
a lower level of cooperation with the superior.  
The PEQs differed by condition, with fewer fields collected for the CEO role. All 
participants provided their gender, age, ethnic identification, years of professional 
experience, and years of professional experience in the financial sector. Employee role 
participants also provided a 2nd rating (in addition to the pre-test) of their passion towards 
the animal rights sector, an attention check of whether or not they were permitted to 
withdraw funds at a penalty during the first task, ratings regarding the empowering and 
collaborative nature of the email, and an open-ended written response on why they 
allocated the first endowment as they chose11.   
 
11 While these responses were mainly used to validate the attention check, they contain many insights for future 
analysis on subordinate responses, preferences, and reactions to the management environment.  
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS & ANALYSIS 
4.1 Data Exclusions & Final Sample Construction 
From a total participant pool of 340, 6 participants’ data were excluded for 
incompleteness. Of the remaining 334, 71 were supervisor roles and 263 employee roles12. 
As the dependent measures are derived from the employee role, the 71 supervisor 
participants were excluded for the purposes of data analysis. From the 263 employee role 
participants, 24 failed the attention check mentioned below, yielding a total eligible sample 
size of 239. After partitioning the sample into amotivated vs. identified motivation based 
on a percentile split of PEQ responses, a final sample of 109 participants remained for 
analysis. Further information on dependent measure characteristics and test assumption 
violations will be discussed on a variable-by-variable basis.  
4.2 Manipulation & Attention Checks 
To ensure the manipulation of communication frame was successfully perceived by 
participants, employee participants were asked to provide two post-experimental 9-point 
Likert scale ratings about the tone of the email they read. The first rating asked “On the 
following scale between controlling and empowering, what was the tone of the message 
you received from the CEO?” The second rating asked “On the following scale between 
instructive and collaborative, how did you perceive the message from the CEO?” An 
untabulated one-way ANOVA was run on these ratings by communication condition and 
 
12 The ratio of supervisor to employee participants is not exactly 1:4 due to uneven data exclusion and timing 
differences in when participants began the experiment (e.g., if a supervisor role began immediately before the 
session’s termination).  
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found to be statistically significant (Q1 F1,93=6.834, p=0.010, Q2 F1,93=9.864, p=0.002), 
indicating that the manipulation of nonformal communication was correctly perceived by 
participants13. Participants in either communication condition were also asked “In the first 
allocation you made (based on the CEO's recommendation), were you given the option to 
withdraw monies from the task at a 50% reduction/penalty?” as an attention check. Of the 
263 participants in the employee role, 24 failed this attention check and their data were 
excluded from analysis14. As mentioned above, participants were assigned to either the 
“Amotivated” or “Identified Motivation” group based on a percentile split of their PEQ 
rating of passion towards the animal rights sector.   
Using the aforementioned independent and dependent variables, an (untabulated) 
Multivariate Analysis of Covariance (MANCOVA) was performed using gender, age, 
professional experience, financial sector experience, and racial background as covariates 
on all main effects and interactions with no statistical significance of the covariates or 
change in the significance of the findings below.  
4.3 Review of Hypothesis #1 Results – Subordinate Goal Congruence 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that, among identified motivation (amotivated) subordinates, 
nonformal communications will elicit higher (lower) goal congruence with superiors vs. 
conventionally framed communications. The mean values represent the percentage of the 
allocation endowment extracted by participants (at a penalty) for their own payoff. In the 
 
13 The differences in degrees of freedom between the manipulation checks and the main sample are due to some 
non-responses in the PEQs. 
14 If those that failed attention checks are included, the results remain unchanged except for the interaction of 
communication frame and identified motivation on the allocation task withdrawal – this is NOT statistically significant 
under a limited sample, but does demonstrate significance with attention check failures included.  
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first of three univariate analyses, this hypothesis was not observed in a 2x2 ANOVA15 on 
the dependent measure of Allocation Task Withdrawal. Against predictions, as seen here 
in Figure 1, no statistically significant interaction of communication frame and identified 
motivation was observed on allocation task withdrawal (F1,105=2.366, p=0.127)16.  
- Insert Figure 1 Here -  
Although the amotivated subordinate group’s average allocation task withdrawal 
was slightly higher than that of the identified motivation group, this was statistically 
insignificant and the communication frame had no impact on this metric of subordinate 
goal congruence. From Table 1, for amotivated participants, the average allocation task 
withdrawal was 24.86 under a conventional frame and 37.78 under a nonformal frame 
(simple main effect F1,105=4.592, p=0.034). Among participants with identified motivation, 
the average allocation task withdrawal under a conventional frame was 20.59, and 15.78 
under a nonformal frame (simple main effect F1,105=0.614, p=0.435). This demonstrates 
that, relative to identified motivation subordinates, the use of an informal control for 
amotivated subordinates actually worsened maladaptive behaviors. Per Table 2, no other 
statistically significant effect of communication frame was observed on any dependent 
variable. 
- Insert Tables 1 and 2 Here -  
 
15 For confirmation, the two dependent measures that proxy for goal congruence were analyzed jointly using a 
MANOVA approach. The results were unchanged from a univariate approach on either variable. Moreover, given 
several MANOVA assumption violations present in the dataset, such an approach may not be well-specified.  
16 All reported tests are two-tailed with a critical p-level of 0.05. 
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Though not explicitly predicted, a main effect of Identified Motivation was 
observed on allocation task withdrawal (F1,105=5.190, p=0.025). Per Table 1, the mean 
withdrawal score was 31.20 for amotivated subordinates and 18.19 for identified 
motivation subordinates. This provides confirmatory evidence for the general advantage of 
preferentially recruiting identified motivation subordinates and their heightened goal 
congruence with superiors.  
Among the three analyses, this ANOVA of allocation task withdrawal suffers from 
multiple violations of test assumptions. In addition to an absence of dependent measure 
normality, a Breusch Pagan Test for Heteroskedasticity was statistically significant 
at χ2=11.215, p=0.001. This indicates a violation of the homoscedasticity assumption. 
Finally, based on the median and using adjusted degrees of freedom, Levene’s Test of Error 
Variances Equality was statistically significant at W=3.412, p=0.021. To attempt a 
correction for these violations, the dependent measure data for allocation task withdrawal 
were rank transformed into a new variable and re-analyzed. In an untabulated analysis, this 
transformation resolved the assumption violations but yielded no significant results other 
than a marginally significant main effect of identified motivation (F1,105=2.990, p=0.087).  
Results in line with predictions were observed for the deviation score, as seen below 
in Figure 2. A statistically significant interaction was observed for communication frame 
vs. identified motivation on the deviation score (F1,105=4.256, p=0.042).  
- Insert Figure 2 Here-  
Per Table 3, for the amotivated participants, a conventional frame yielded an 
average deviation score of 1.061 vs. 1.732 for a nonformal frame (simple main effect 
F1,105=6.498, 0.012). For identified motivation participants, the opposite pattern of mean 
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was observed between the two communication frames. Under a conventional frame, the 
mean was 1.543 and the mean under a nonformal frame was 1.252 (simple main effect 
F1,105=0.880, p=0.350. As displayed in the ANOVA output of Table 4, there were no 
statistically significant main effects of either frame or motivation level, per predictions.  
- Insert Tables 3 & 4 Here-  
Notwithstanding the various ANOVA assumption violations on the allocation task 
score data and the (likely associated) lack of statistically significant results in line with 
predictions, there are still valuable insights in these responses. The divergence of results 
between the two dependent measures for goal congruence may be informative as to the 
deeper differences between the two groups. Whereas the withdrawal share proxies for a 
subordinate’s desire to wholly depart from the superior’s goal for personal goal/payoff 
instead, the deviation score addresses how the task-specific preferences of the subordinate 
depart from the superior’s. It is tenable that the proposed informal control is effective in 
aligning superior and subordinate preferences, but not strong enough to diminish 
maladaptive subordinate behaviors. Further analysis/data collection may be warranted to 
examine why informal controls dissimilarly affected these measures.  
4.4 Review of Hypothesis #2 Results – Subsequent Cooperation 
The second hypothesis also predicts the asymmetric effects of nonformal 
communication on identified motivation level, but instead uses the common pool game 
withdrawals as a proxy for a subordinate’s subsequent cooperation with the superior in an 
undirected task. The lower the mean value, the more funds were shared by the participant 
with the superior. Once again, the asymmetric effects on identified motivation levels are 
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observed with a statistically significant, disordinal interaction in Figure 3 between 
communication frame and identified motivation level (F1,105=7.342, p=0.008). Per the 
ANOVA in Table 6 below. No statistically significant main effect on common pool 
withdrawals was observed for either identified motivation or communication frame. This 
confirms that either category of subordinates’ subsequent cooperation is at best weakly 
affected by either conventional or nonformal communication.  
- Insert Figure 3 Here -  
As seen in Table 5, average common pool withdrawals of amotivated participants 
were 1,429 experimental dollars under a conventional frame and 2,426 under a nonformal 
frame (simple main effect F1,105=3.609, p=0.060). Indeed, nonformal communications had 
the surprising effect of worsening subsequent cooperation among amotivated participants.  
In contrast, those with identified motivation, on average, withdrew 2,444 under a 
conventional frame and 1,614 under a nonformal frame (simple main effect F1,105=4.497, 
p=0.036). In line with the parameters of Stewardship Theory and identified motivation 
crowd-out, those with identified motivation towards the task likely interpreted the 
conventional framing as limiting their autonomy and as the superior adopting a 
transactional rather than collaboration approach. This demonstrates that the highest 
respective levels of cooperative behavior for either group are dependent on the use of 
informal controls.  





CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
Given the limitations of both formal management control systems and the preferential 
selection of subordinates with identified motivation towards an unobservable task, I use 
experimental methods to investigate the asymmetric effects and suitability of informal 
control systems in this environment. By testing nonformal versus conventional 
communications and measuring subordinate goal congruence and subsequent cooperation 
with a superior in an undirected task, I observe that subordinates’ reactions to informal 
controls can be a function of their innate preferences and identified motivation. Those with 
little to no identified motivation towards the superior’s objective exhibited more congruous 
and cooperative behavior under conventional, transactional management communication. 
Conversely, individuals with high levels of identified motivation demonstrated heightened 
maladaptive behaviors under conventional conditions, and were best aligned with the 
superior’s objectives under a nonformal, collaborative management communication 
approach.  
This study provides evidence that the framework of identified motivation under 
Self-Determination Theory generalizes to an unobservable task environment, and that 
elements of Stewardship Theory manifest in the accounting realm of resource allocation. 
By selectively utilizing an informal control regime that emphasizes collaboration and 
autonomy, superiors can improve subordinate decisions without costly formal controls or 
risks of crowding out subordinates’ identified motivation. This study also provided some 
support for the potential unintended consequences of informal control usage and the 
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associated risks of giving certain types of subordinates too much autonomy or authority in 
unobservable tasks.  
 Within the realm of informal controls, this study also advances the effectiveness of 
internal controls that do not organically evolve. Unlike the common examples of social 
norms, clan controls, and organizational culture, which cannot be easily implemented or 
manipulated by the superior, the use of nonformal communications is another option for 
management to align subordinate with firm objectives without the costs, implications, or 
drawbacks of formal MCS. Included in this category of intentional, informal MCS are the 
similar approaches of establishing codes of ethics and promulgating firm value statements.  
 As with all experimental approaches, there are limits to the generalizability of these 
findings and some caveats to their applicability to practice. Similar to other protocols 
conducted using an online participant pool, some design choices were implemented to 
accommodate a shorter data collection window and diminished experimental control. Had 
a laboratory setting or a traditional participant pool been available, the pre-test would have 
been conducted at least a week prior to and independently of the main session. This would 
have allowed for main experiment administration to only those participants at the upper 
and lower bounds of identified motivation for the animal rights sector, and therefore fewer 
discarded/omitted data from analysis. Moreover, while PEQ responses confirm that the 
instructions and manipulations were effectively executed, the entire protocol was kept 
intentionally simplified both to ward against compound manipulations and, more acutely, 
to remedy the limited attention span of online experiment participants. It is tenable that an 
increase in the instructions/details and mundane realism of the study would sway the 
participants in their responses and perceptions of the task.  
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The setting intentionally abstracts away from a more realistic, multi-task setting 
common to many subordinates in order to obtain a clear, causal connection between 
nonformal communication and subordinate decisions. The study also does not currently 
generalize to environments where the subordinate simultaneously engages in observable 
tasks for which a formal MCS is available. Future expansions of these results could 
introduce a controlled task in tandem with the unobservable allocations to further delineate 
the effects of nonformal communications. Moreover, the experiment was designed to be 
easily executed and relatable to those in the general population, and did not necessitate the 
expertise or higher-order reasoning skills that many identified motivation subordinates use 
in their professions and unobservable tasks. While the results from the general population 
sample do not negate or minimize the contributions of this study, a more specialized 
participant pool may enhance the generalizability of the theoretical underpinnings.  
The results of this study offer several avenues for future testing and exploration. 
Within the usage of nonformal controls, additional trials can utilize an alternate entity type 
setting rather than the not-for-profit setting used in this study. Additional testing to reflect 
the standard for-profit or even a government setting in the instrument can strengthen the 
applicability of the control’s usage. Similar experiments involving other organic informal 
controls, such as social norm activation and “clan control,” are the logical next steps: this 
would achieve convergent validity between variants of controls in practice. And given the 
prevalence of such research in the managerial sphere, additional experiments can shift from 
allocation tasks to effortful or creative tasks. This, coupled with the aforementioned 
introduction of controlled tasks and specialized participants, may more strongly proxy for 









Conventional Nonformal Conventional Nonformal
H1 - Allocation Task Withdrawal + Prediction
Iden. Motv No Iden. Motv Yes Predict No Predict Yes















Figure 1 - Pattern of Results + Predictions: Allocation Task Withdrawal 
 
Table 1 - Descriptives - Allocation Task Withdrawal 
 
No Yes Total
Mean 24.86 20.59 22.76
Std. Dev. 26.07 30.93 28.37
n 28 27 55
Mean 37.78 15.78 26.78
Std. Dev. 40.06 19.73 33.19
n 27 27 54
Mean 31.20 18.19 24.75
Std. Dev. 33.98 25.81 30.77

































Conventional Nonformal Conventional Nonformal
H1 - Deviation Score + Prediction
Iden. Motv No Iden. Motv Yes Predict No Predict Yes




Mean 1.061 1.543 1.297
Std. Dev. 1.019 1.373 1.219
n 28 27 55
Mean 1.732 1.252 1.492
Std. Dev. 1.462 0.939 1.241
n 27 27 54
Mean 1.390 1.397 1.394
Std. Dev. 1.289 1.174 1.228



















Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p
Communication Frame 0.000 1 0.000 0.000 0.997
Identified Motivation 0.987 1 0.987 0.666 0.416
Frame * Identified Motivation 6.305 1 6.305 4.256 0.042
Error 155.529 105 1.481
Table 3 - Descriptives: Allocation Task Deviation Score 
 
 




Mean 1429 2444 1927
Std. Dev. 1520 1788 1720
n 28 27 55
Mean 2426 1614 2020
Std. Dev. 1994 1716 1887
n 27 27 54
Mean 1918 2029 1973
Std. Dev. 1823 1786 1797












Conventional Nonformal Conventional Nonformal
H2 - Common Pool Withdrawal + Prediction 
Iden. Motv No Iden. Motv Yes Predict No Predict Yes














Table 6 - Two Way ANOVA on Common Pool Withdrawal 
 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p
Communication Frame 283395 1 283395 0.091 0.763
Identified Motivation 190163 1 190163 0.061 0.805
Frame * Identified Motivation 22752968 1 22752968 7.342 0.008
Error 325384786 105 3098903
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APPENDIX B. EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS & MATERIALS 
5.1 Experimental Instructions 
{{After the initial pre-test questions and filler tasks, the participants are directed to the 
main experiment}} 
________________________________________________________________________ 
     
[This introductory page is the same for both roles] 
 
Welcome to the study! On the next few pages, you will review some instructions and be 
asked to make decisions. Your decisions are completely anonymous to other participants 
in the study and to the experimenters. Additionally, no deception is used in this study. 
While the study asks you to imagine yourself in a fictional setting, the decisions you make 




In this study, you will make a recommendation about how resources should be             
allocated by another participant in the study. That participant will then decide, based on 
your recommendation, an actual donation to a charity in the animal rights advocacy sector. 
The identity of the organization will be revealed at the end of the study. On the next screen 




You have 5000 experimental dollars to allocate to a reputable, 501(c)3 animal rights 
advocacy organization according to one of the options below. The identity of the 
organization and the conversation rate from experimental “dollars” to U.S. Dollars will be 
revealed at the end of the study. 
 
(Note that General Program Costs relate to the main organizational mission objectives, 
Fundraising Costs assist with generating revenues, and Administrative Costs reflect the 
financial needs of non-program operations.) 
 
Please choose between one of the following options: 
 
 20% Administrative / 20% Fundraising / 30% Wildlife Conservation / 30% Animal Adoption 
 30% Administrative / 30% Fundraising / 20% Wildlife Conservation / 20% Animal Adoption 






{final page after completing demographic PEQs} 
 
This is the end of the study. Thank you for your participation!! 
 
The identity of the charitable organization is the World Wildlife Foundation. Other 
participants in the experiment were given your recommendation as a guide for a real-life 
donation. 
 
To obtain the final amounts/purposes donated at the end of all study sessions, please 
message the experimenters via the anonymous Prolific chat function. 
 
As a result of other participants' actions, you may receive a bonus payment via Prolific 
within two weeks. This payment represents your share of a similar allocation decision made 
by another participant. The bonus payment will range from $0 to $4. The conversion rate 
from experimental currency to USD was 4000 to 1. 
 
[Employee role] 
Imagine you are a Department Manager at a local, mid-range company. You were hired for 
your passion and expertise, and have just received a new assignment related to the 
company’s community engagement. On a subsequent page, you will view a communication 
from the company's CEO [another participant in the study] with the details. After that, you 
will decide how to allocate the provided funds associated with the project. The 
recommendation is NOT a requirement and the decision is entirely yours. 
You will have 5000 experimental dollars to allocate. Based on your allocation, an actual 
donation will be made to a reputable, 501(c)3 organization in the animal rights advocacy 
sector. The identity of the organization and the conversion from “experimental dollars” to 
U.S. Dollars will be revealed at the end of the study. (For any monies earned in the course 
of the experiment, you will be paid via Prolific bonus payment within two weeks.) 
 
{subsequent page – employee role views stylized email: see §5.2, figures #4 & #5} 
 




Thank you for your allocation. 
 
In addition to the budget provided for the firm’s community involvement, you have also 
been provided a discretionary fund. The fund contains another 5000 experimental dollars. 
You may take out as much as you’d like, and whatever is left after your withdrawal will be 
multiplied by 1.6 and split between you and your CEO [the participant in this study who 




{{Here the participant enters an integer between 0 and 5000 and the amounts earned by the 
CEO and the participant are auto-calculated and displayed below the input field. This was 
done to ensure the participant truly understood the allocation/calculation.}} 
 
{final page after completing demographic PEQs} 
 
This is the end of the study. Thank you for your participation!! 
 
Based on your decisions in the study, the following amounts have been donated to World 
Wildlife Foundation for the following purposes: 
 




Programs - Wildlife Conservation_______ 
Programs - Animal Adoption_______ 
Withdrawal_______ 
 
To obtain the final amounts/purposes donated at the end of all study sessions, please 
message the experimenters via the anonymous Prolific chat function. 
 
You have earned the following based on your decisions in the study:________ {{in USD}} 
 

































Figure 6 - Allocation Task Page 
Figure 4 - Stylized Email (Conventional Frame) 
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